

Inspiring, life affirming, poignant. This densely packed volume of wisdom from the hearts and minds of people most intimately targeted by climate change illustrates what is at stake, provides a vision of what must be done, and cogently illustrates an intersectional analysis that includes the environment. There is no other book like it.

Kari Marie Norgaard, *Associate Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies, University of Oregon, USA*

At one level climate change seems so simple: too much carbon in the atmosphere. But as this provocative volume makes clear, the real truth is far more complicated and interesting. There's never been a better lens than global warming for looking at the ways that power is wielded on our planet, and these essays, poems, and images do much to bring that picture into sharp focus.

Bill McKibben, *founder of 350.org, USA*

Passionately mixing scholarly, activist, and poetic analysis of global climate change, this volume takes anti-racist and queerfeminist intersectional analysis to new levels of critical transgression and global understanding. It makes a strong case for using intersectionality to deconstruct and decolonialize borders between struggles for climate, environmental, social, and reproductive justice.

Nina Lykke, *Professor of Gender Studies and co-director of the Centre for Gender Excellence (GEXcel), Linköping University, Sweden*

The work offers an innovative synthesis of two key sociological approaches – “intersectionality” and “just sustainabilities”. Challenging both media denials and the silo methodologies of academia, Godfrey, Torres, and their community of authors are relentless in their diagnosis of exploitive social prejudices that drive the Anthropocene, globalization, climate change, food scarcity, and violence.

Ariel Salleh, *author of Ecofeminism as Politics*

Systemic Crises of Global Climate Change

Intersections of race, class and gender

Edited by Phoebe Godfrey and
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An intersectional approach to the urban equity dilemma

Chandra Russo and Andrew Pattison

The leading international climate research institution, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has demonstrated that climate change will have devastating impacts on communities the world over if there is not substantive policy intervention. Those who face the intersections of racism, classism, and sexism have long borne the brunt of environmental hazards, both globally and in the USA (Agyeman et al., 2003; Bullard, 2005; Chavis and Lee, 1987). This is no different when it comes to climate change which, under existing social conditions, puts the global poor, people of color, and women at the greatest risk (Nagel, 2012; Shearer, 2011). While such a dynamic is often discussed as it impacts the Global South, classism, racism, and patriarchy have intersected to immiserate certain urban communities in the USA, rendering them vulnerable not only to climate change itself but also to the collateral damage of the very policies intended to prevent environmental destruction.

While the issue of climate change has drawn immense attention from policymakers the world over, the USA, one of the greatest national consumers of natural resources and carbon emitters, has refused to advance meaningful climate legislation. In the vacuum of federal action, cities and states have taken up the mantle for meaningful progress, most commonly through the development of climate action planning (Ramaswami et al., 2012; Boswell et al., 2012; Finn and McCormick, 2011). A Climate Action Plan (CAP) lays out a program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through programs to generate renewable energy, reduce buildings' energy use, cut transportation and land use-related emissions, and reduce emissions from waste management (Boswell et al., 2010).

The proliferation of CAPs in US cities is an exciting development for the environmental movement. However, there is growing evidence that local climate planning has neglected issues of social equity (Finn and McCormick, 2011; Pearsall and Pierce, 2010). Many scholars have pointed out the impossibility of the capitalist ethos that promises perpetual economic growth. On a planet with finite space, resources and resiliency, continual development, even if it is green, is not merely stratifying, it is also built upon a flawed premise (Noble, 2012). Moreover, for those living at the intersections of raced, classed, and gendered disadvantages, CAPs may not signal an improvement but, ironically, a deterioration in their potentially sustainable livelihood. Modeled in a

long tradition of urban planning that prioritizes profitable growth at the cost of equity and fairness (Mollenkopf, 1983; Harvey, 1973), CAPs may actually deepen gendered, raced, and classed inequities of wealth and opportunity in US cities.

In what follows, we briefly explain how CAPs have emerged in cities and municipalities throughout the USA as a foremost policy tool for fighting climate change. We then examine the intersections of race, gender, and class to discover who does and does not have access to wealth in the urban spaces where the vast majority of CAPs are enacted. We conclude with an intersectional assessment of the most common features in municipal CAPs. We suggest that CAPs render the needs of poor communities of color and a disproportionate number of women invisible while doing little to ameliorate cavernous wealth divides in US cities. CAPs thereby do not successfully address what many scholars agree to be one of the root causes of environmental degradation and climate change: systemic inequality (Wilkinson et al., 2010; Agyeman et al., 2003).

Global climate change and the promise of municipal CAPs

Beginning in the industrial age, the burning of fossil fuels from coal and natural gas plants as well as tailpipe emissions has released enough greenhouse gas into the Earth's atmosphere to impact a change in the planet's climate (IPCC, 2014). While some continue to argue that human-caused climate change is not scientifically verified, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change confirms anthropogenic "warming of the climate system" (IPCC, 2014), which has spurred global action. In February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to address climate change, went into effect, setting emission reduction targets for all signatory countries. While nearly 200 countries have ratified the protocol to date, a complex of corporate and political interests have prevented the USA from participating in the treaty or the promulgation of its own climate legislation (Layzer, 2011). Those interested in curbing environmental destruction have thus turned to target policy choices at the city, county, and state levels.

As one example, on the same day that the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in 2005, Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels helped launch the US Mayors Climate Protection Act to advance the goals of the Kyoto Protocol through local government action (USMCPA, 2013). As of April, 2013 there were more than 1000 cities that had signed the Act, committing to employ a variety of climate-related policies, typically taking the form of a Climate Action Plan (CAP). In the years since, CAPs have become the climate change prevention strategy throughout the USA, becoming ever more integrated into traditional city planning processes, complete with formal adoption by city councils (Boswell et al., 2010). However, as greater amounts of monetary capital and political will go toward planning and implementing CAPs, some have warned about the pitfalls of fashioning climate change prevention strategies in the mainstream urban

planning tradition (Finn and McCormick, 2011). Critics suggest that the priorities of economic growth have long trumped those of equity in municipal politics (Pearsall and Pierce, 2010). CAPs are thus ill suited for pursuing any version of environmental protection that might constrain the interests of capital (Lutzhiser and Hackett, 1993; Logan and Molotch, 1987). With this in mind, we now turn to the dynamics governing access to capital in urban centers.

An intersectional assessment of urban wealth inequality

An intersectional analysis suggests that racism, classism, and sexism cannot be disaggregated when considering the lived experiences of individuals and communities who face overlapping oppressions and, contrastingly, overlapping privileges (Collins, 1991; Crenshaw, 1991; hooks, 1984). Applied to a study of US cities, an intersectional lens reveals how race, class, and gender work together to largely determine which communities have access to capital, desirable real estate, and political clout (Peake, 1997; Sze, 2007). For the purposes of assessing the impact of CAPs, we are predominantly interested in who constitutes the urban, low-income population, as we argue that these communities disproportionately bear the costs of current climate change prevention strategies. An intersectional approach demonstrates that urban low-income communities are forged by the overlapping systems of not only class stratification, but also racism and patriarchy. Drawing upon this insight allows us to examine differential access to capital as well as the spatial segregation of US cities, both important factors in analyzing the impacts of CAPs.

Harvey's (1973) analysis of how class functions in the urban environment is a useful starting point. For Harvey, as for Marx, social class is not merely a measure of income or wealth, but a delineation of how individuals and social groups relate to capital and the means of production. In other words, how people make their money is class stratified and relevant in the urban environment. **When it comes to sustainable urban planning, for instance, the capitalist class is able to accrue wealth through investment in new, green technologies and energy-efficient property. The working classes and urban underemployed, on the other hand, depend on their labor, state assistance, and informal economies to earn an income.**

Furthering his application of Marx to the study of urban development, Harvey argues that those who own property and rent or sell it to others, such as landlords and realtors, are able to use housing and property "as a means of exchange – housing services are exchanged for money" (Harvey, 1973, p. 164). **For renters, on the other hand, housing serves predominately as a use value, a place in which to reside. This means that those who rent are investing their incomes in the use of their houses as homes without gaining monetary profit or access to capital from this property. In juxtaposition, those who own property are able to accrue wealth on that property. Whether different groups are able to relate to property as having use or exchange value determines the possibility of earning profit and developing assets.**

Class as a relationship to capital is racially segregated, with communities of color facing generations of asset stripping, barriers in access to property, and lower wages (Massey and Denton, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006). Scholars have argued that the wealth divide between white communities and people of color is largely due to accumulated assets, not earned income, and Americans hold most of their wealth in their homes (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997). For generations, people of color have been excluded from owning property and today face redlining, reverse redlining, predatory subprime mortgage lending, and rejection by insurance companies to protect property (Squires, 2003).

Moreover, legacies of subsidized white flight to the suburbs along with the dominant strategy of urban growth means that "decades of runaway sprawl have resulted in a geographically segregated society" (Chen, 2007, p. 299). This has disproportionately trapped people of color into asset-poor inner cities (Noble, 2012; Wilson, 1987; Mollenkopf, 1983). Industrial restructuring under neoliberalism has also had its most devastating impact on the wages and work opportunities of people of color who have been forced to turn to government assistance and informal economies to make ends meet (Wacquant, 2009). These communities are today over-policed and hyper-incarcerated, further damaging the earning potentials of families of color (Lipsitz, 2006).

The neoliberal policies that have restructured the US labor force, shrunk the state's safety net, and further segregated US cities have also converged to create the "feminization of poverty" in America, meaning that more women than men are poor (Peake, 1997). As low-paying service work has replaced middle-income jobs, women's per capita income has decreased. Women work longer hours for lower wages. The federal government has systematically dismantled the assistance programs for families and children upon which single mothers depend (Amott, 1993). It is no wonder that poverty rates are highest for single-headed families, a fact that is exaggerated for women (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2009). Nevertheless, while women, and specifically mothers, are disproportionately represented in low-income communities, this must be contextualized in terms of both race and class. In fact, being a white woman still confers relative income benefits, as white women continue to earn more than men of color (McCall, 2000).

For decades, activists and scholars in the environmental justice tradition have demonstrated that those who face the intersections of racism, classism, and sexism bear the brunt of environmental threats. Their neighborhoods are most often sited for toxic waste facilities, and they face the most dire environmental health dangers (Taylor, 2014; Bullard, 2005; Chavis and Lee, 1987). Because women of color are multiply disadvantaged in urban spaces and most often responsible for the care of children and the elderly (UNDP, 2007), they have also been at the forefront of confronting the environmental decay that threatens their families and communities (Sze, 2007; Di Chiro, 2008). However, their voices and actions are all but invisible in much of the public discourse informing municipal climate change policy (Shrader-Frechette, 2002). While urban policy-making may have the potential for dismantling environmental injustice

if envisioned from an intersectional perspective, today's proposed solutions do not achieve this. Rather, CAPs, as a foremost version of municipal efforts to curb climate change, may in fact reproduce environmental injustice. We now apply an intersectional assessment of urban wealth inequality to an analysis of three key features in municipal CAPs.

CAPs and the (re)production of intersectional inequalities

CAPs generally contain provisions to: (1) increase renewable energy generation; (2) decrease energy consumption by built structures, and (3) reduce transportation emissions (Betsill and Rabe, 2009; Boswell et al., 2010, 2012; Ramaswami et al., 2012). Although water and waste reduction are often addressed and are important for comprehensive sustainability planning, they are not usually the major features of CAPs. For this reason we do not include them in our analysis. In what follows we look at examples of each of these to show that, as currently structured, the majority of CAPs provide wealth accumulation opportunities for those with access to capital while continuing to disinvest in urban women, communities of color, and the working and underemployed poor.

Increasing renewable energy generation

CAPs typically seek to increase the amount of energy generated from renewable sources in three major ways: the renewable portfolio standard, fees and taxes on energy use, and incentives for clean energy generation in building construction. All of these are structured in a regressive manner as large purchasers and those with investment capital are granted opportunities to increase their savings and profits while low-income communities bear disproportionate hardships.

The "renewable portfolio standard" mandates that utility companies use more renewable fuels, such as wind or solar energy, in order to reduce the GHG emissions that come from burning "dirtier" fuel sources like coal and gas. Renewable portfolio standards have been shown to dramatically increase renewable energy production in multiple parts of the country and, in this sense, effectively curtail climate change emissions at the local level (Ramaswami et al., 2012). However, such policies are also associated with at least some increase in energy costs for customers (Wiser et al., 2007). Large corporations that consume greater resources are given a kind of wholesale discount, as the more energy a single buyer purchases, the less it has to pay per unit. In this way, those with greater capital displace increased energy costs onto smaller scale consumers, such as home owners and renters. Further, as lower income US residents spend a higher proportion of their income on energy, they are the most negatively impacted by the energy rate increases in renewable portfolio standards. While state-funded energy assistance programs have the potential to alleviate these impacts, such programs have been de-funded since the energy crises of the late 1970s (see Higgins and Lutzenhiser (1995) for an excellent history of the decline of federal

funding to states supporting low-income energy assistance programs and the attempts to replace these programs with traditional welfare assistance and non-profit or civic organizations).

A second and similar policy tool to increase renewable energy production includes fees and taxes on energy consumption. "Carbon taxes" are applied either to energy consumption or to the volume of emissions generated. Akin to the price increases associated with renewable portfolio standards, these taxation schemes are structured so that major consumers pay less tax per energy unit. Such programs have been used more extensively outside of the USA, where researchers have found that they disproportionately impact those with less wealth. In Denmark, for instance, carbon taxes have been found to be more regressive than income and even sales tax, which is usually considered to be the most regressive tax (Wier et al., 2005).

A third common means for increasing renewable energy generation provides enticements for producing energy at the building site itself, such as through monetary incentives for property owners who install solar panel roofing. An example of this is the California Solar Initiative, which promises financial benefits for on-site solar energy generation installations on existing residential homes and other kinds of properties. This program has been enormously successful by traditional environmental measures, allowing California to become the first state to install more than one gigawatt of customer-generated solar energy. However, of the more than 100,000 customers who were able to take advantage of the program in 2011, only 1 percent of those were families making less than \$50,000 in annual income (CPUC, 2012). This meager number of low-income family participation exists despite government gestures at making the program broadly accessible. The Single-family Affordable Solar Homes (SASH) program was implemented alongside the California Solar Initiative to help include those who could most benefit from cost-saving solar installations in the program. However, that only 1 percent of participants were doing so through SASH suggests that the program's subsidies for low-income families have had little benefit for low-income communities and people of color who wish to take advantage of the California Solar Initiative. While laudable in intention, SASH appears impotent in practice.

Decreasing energy consumption by built structures

The second major category in CAPs seeks to reduce the amount of energy consumed by built structures through 'green building policies.' Green building policies range from improving the quality of building insulation for better temperature regulation, to installing roofs that capture rainwater, to establishing stricter limits for energy use in buildings. Green building policies are promising for curbing carbon emissions, but tend to offer profitable investment opportunities for those who can afford new property or upgrades to what they already own. Meanwhile, by way of increased rental pricing, the cost of housing is transferred to those who do not own their homes. Thus, Harvey's (1973 [2009])

critical assessment of the city as a nexus for reproducing income inequality through property ownership under neoliberal capitalism resonates. Those who do not own are forced to spend a growing percentage of their income on housing that is not accruing equity while contributing less to personal savings in the hope of future ownership.

Green building measures can be implemented either in the form of new construction or as retrofits to existing buildings. This translates into up-front costs for developers and owners but significant long-term savings owing to the decrease in energy expenditures. As one indicator of the financial benefits of green construction, the 2013 Building Energy Efficiency Standards in California are predicted to increase the cost of constructing a new home by \$2290 (CEC, 2012). However, home owners are expected to save triple this amount over a 30-year mortgage. On the other hand, rents increase as property owners are able to displace increased costs on renters. What monetary benefits renters see in decreased utilities expenditures are dwarfed by the cost of increased rents. This inequity is not merely an unfortunate arrangement of the financial system but actually a wealth generator for those who own property. Indeed, the fact that energy-efficiency standards increase rental prices for commercial real estate is a point used to tout the 'business-friendly' nature of these policies (Fuerst and McAllister, 2011). There are further barriers for low-income communities in seeing the financial benefits of making their homes more energy efficient. Even in cities and towns where energy-efficiency measures for homes are not mandatory, but rather voluntary or subsidized, those without wealth are often unable to access capital to make energy cost-saving retrofits due to economic status or lack of "credit worthiness" (Golove and Eto, 1996). Again, while government assistance and grant programs could alleviate this inequity if aggressively implemented, these have been downsized and receive little political support in today's budget constrained economy.

Reducing transportation emissions

As transportation generates a large percentage of carbon emissions, an important category of CAPs includes efforts to decrease vehicle miles traveled (VMT). There are two major ways in which this is done: taxes or pricing schemes that raise the cost of driving, and the redesign of urban space for maximum transportation efficiency. We treat these in order.

1 Pricing schemes

There are three ways in which CAPs propose to raise the cost of automobile travel: taxes on fuel; taxes on driving during peak traffic flow; and incentives for hybrid or electric vehicle owners. The first two techniques, similar to other taxation proposals in CAPs, are regressive in nature. Low-income communities spend a greater proportion of their income on energy costs, not only for the home but also in the form of gasoline for vehicles (Lutzenhiser and Hackett,

1993). Thus, fuel and congestion taxes impact low-income communities more than they affect those with greater wealth (Sevigny, 1998). The third technique – enticements for the owners of non-traditional automobiles – again benefits those with greater disposable incomes while neglecting the transportation needs of the working classes, people of color, and women. Better parking spots or highway lanes are really the tip of the iceberg as hybrid and electric vehicles are but another green technology which benefits those with access to capital. More expensive than traditional vehicles, hybrid and electric cars require a high up-front cost. For instance, based on a cost comparison of these three automobiles conducted online at www.toyota.com, the 2012 Toyota Prius hybrid costs 50 percent more, and the 2012 Chevrolet Volt, an electric car, costs twice as much as the comparably sized, traditional fuel 2012 Toyota Matrix. Still, hybrid and electric cars come with the promise of significant savings in fuel prices over time, a promise that offers little for those who cannot afford these cars in the first place.

2 Land use policy

The organization of urban space through different land use policy is another manner of reducing emissions from the transportation sector. Distinct from policies intended to raise the cost of car travel, we understand the emerging category of 'transit-oriented development' to have the potential to remedy legacies of raced, classed, and gendered spatial segregation in US cities. Transit-oriented development locates high-density, mixed-use urban space close to low-cost, public transportation, such as light rails or major bus routes. These mixed-use developments incorporate a diversity of residential and commercial zones, allowing housing, employment, and retail opportunities to be positioned close together (Boarnet and Compin, 1999).

Community leaders have argued that transit-oriented development could actually benefit low-income communities the most because of its dramatic potential to reduce transportation costs. For instance, while not attending to distinctions based on race, class, or gender, the Center for Transit-Oriented Development nevertheless predicts that families residing in 'transit-rich neighborhoods' will spend less than one-tenth of their income on transportation. This is in comparison to families in automobile-dependent neighborhoods who spend an entire quarter of their income on transportation (Belzer and Poticha, 2009).

The problem is that these projects are rarely implemented in a manner that integrates low-income communities into policy considerations or the planning process itself (Wood and Brooks, 2009). There are a few reasons for this. First, transit-oriented development is a relatively new way of arranging urban space. Historically, US policy has encouraged home ownership, especially for white families, as a means for wealth accrual. However, providing a house and land for each nuclear family has long meant pushing sectors of the population into the suburbs, far away from most public transport (Markusen, 1980). Transportation-oriented development intends to achieve the opposite of the sprawling urban spaces that these earlier policies encouraged. Working against the historical

gradient by which US cities have been organized, urban densification is still seen as experimental by many in the private and public sector. Those with surplus capital tend to be the ones investing in, and hence envisioning the design of, transit-oriented development. At the very least, this raises concerns regarding procedural equity, as middle- and certainly lower-income communities are rarely part of planning these new communities (Belzer and Poticha, 2009). The state's role in promoting transit-oriented development by incentivizing the private sector through tax credits further presupposes that those with wealth will be the ones to guide transit-oriented development.

Evidence also suggests that transit-oriented development prioritizes new construction over the preservation of already existing neighborhoods, endangering the affordable housing that does exist near transportation hubs. A 2008 report found that contracts on nearly two-thirds of the privately owned, subsidized housing within walking distance of public transportation in US cities were to expire by 2013, at which point private owners might choose to replace affordable housing with more profitable development (National Housing Trust and Reconnecting America, 2008). In the San Francisco Bay area, affordable housing is increasingly being located away from low-cost transportation toward the periphery of the city (Chapple et al., 2007), demonstrating that those with investment capital guide transit-oriented development to the exclusion of low-income communities.

Further, a number of studies demonstrate that without a substantial expansion of public transport in nearly every major US city, low-income communities cannot benefit much from these transportation opportunities even if they can afford nearby housing. Most low-wage and entry-level positions that employ these communities are not accessible by public transport (Coulton et al., 1996). Moreover, those receiving state assistance – disproportionately low-income women – are often forced to juggle geographically dispersed, entry-level shift work with childcare, education, and state-mandated job training. In lacking reliable and accessible public transportation, society's most vulnerable risk missing their various state-mandated obligations, resulting in serious penalties (Chen, 2007).

Thus, TOD creates a bit of a paradox for low-income communities. Housing closer to affordable transportation has become prime real estate, forcing the working poor further away from public transport to where housing is affordable. Still, in the absence of adequate public transport, households face longer commutes, wiping out any intended savings in housing costs. A recent study (Haas et al., 2006) demonstrates that lower income households are constantly budgeting transportation against housing expenditures. Averaging expenses across 28 metropolitan areas in the USA, the study finds that for the wealthy urban dweller earning between \$100 and \$250,000 annually, only 22 percent of annual income is spent on housing and transportation combined. For those making \$35,000 to \$50,000 a year, this total expenditure jumps to 39 percent. Making less than \$20,000 a year means that affording housing and transportation is, in fact, impossible. Those in this bracket spend 115 percent of their income – more than they have – on transportation and housing alone.

The challenges that those without access to capital face in making ends meet are not alleviated by the current model of transit-oriented development with its foundations in privatized development with limited state intervention. Of course, land use patterns and social inequality pre-date CAPs. Nevertheless, as long as CAPs do not ensure the creation and maintenance of affordable housing in conjunction with an expanded public transportation system, current divisions in urban wealth and property ownership are only exacerbated.

Conclusion

This analysis shows some of the current inequities inherent in climate action planning. At best, subnational CAPs can help reduce carbon emissions as a meaningful bulwark against climate change. On the other hand, CAPs appear to be the latest incarnation of urban policies that deepen inequality along gendered, raced, and classed lines. CAPs often deploy regressive pricing structures. They benefit those who own property and have access to investment capital while shifting the costs of technological advancements and energy savings onto the poor. As women, communities of color, and the urban underemployed and working classes have less access to capital and property ownership, they are often merely left out of the financial benefits that other communities receive. More often, they are actually further disadvantaged by CAPs. The few programs that have sought to offer access to these environmentally beneficial practices have proven largely ineffective.

We argue that CAPs are front and center in the urban equity dilemma. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess whether the CAP, forged in the classical urban planning tradition and leveraged on a bedrock of neoliberalism, is capable of overcoming the raced, gendered, and classed inequities that plague our cities. It does seem, however, that small assistance programs for households and incentives for private developers have been insufficient to counter legacies of social injustice. If we are to begin to make the emission reductions necessary to address climate change, a fundamental transition to a more redistributive economy, especially as it relates to household energy expenditures, is required. Indeed, creating a climate action agenda that simultaneously addresses environmental destruction while dismantling the raced, gendered, and classed axes of exclusion and disadvantage in American cities is the only environmentally and socially just option.

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39 Dear future generations

Sorry

Prince Ea

Dear future generations,
 I think I speak for the rest of us when I say,
 sorry, sorry we left you our mess of a planet.
 Sorry that we were too caught up in our own doings to do something.
 Sorry we listened to people who made excuses,
 to do nothing.
 I hope you forgive us,
 we just didn't realize how special the earth was,
 like a marriage going wrong,
 we didn't know what we had until it was gone.
 For example,
 I'm guessing you probably know what is the Amazon Desert, right?
 Well believe it or not,
 it was once called the Amazon Rain Forest,
 and there were billions of trees there,
 and all of them gorgeous and just um.
 Oh, you don't know much about trees, do you?
 Well let me tell you that trees are amazing,
 and I mean, we literally breath the air
 they are creating, and they clean up our pollution,
 our carbon, store and purify water,
 give us medicine that cures ours diseases, food that feeds us.
 Which is why I am so sorry, to tell you that,
 we burned them down.
 Cut them down with brutal machines, horrific,
 at a rate of 40 football fields every minute,
 that's 50% of all the trees in the world all gone
 in the last 100 years.
 Why? For this.

And that wouldn't make me so sad,
 if there weren't so many pictures of leaves on it.
 You know when I was a child,
 I read how the Native Americans had such consideration,
 for the planet that they felt responsible,
 for how they left the land for the next 7 generations.